Abstract
Since its inception in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has reached its 10th anniversary, with several landmark infrastructure projects completed in Southeast Asia, significantly enhancing China’s regional influence. This study examines recent adjustments in China’s BRI infrastructure strategy, explores its strategic considerations in Southeast Asia, and analyzes five key projects: the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway (Indonesia), the China-Laos Railway, the China-Thailand Railway, the China-Myanmar Railway, and Malaysia’s East Coast Rail Link (ECRL). The analysis focuses on their current progress, major controversies, and evaluates their broader implications, offering policy recommendations for Taiwan.
China’s goals in promoting BRI infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia are to consolidate its political and economic influence in the region, address security and energy concerns related to the Malacca Dilemma through railway and port development and facilitate the internationalization of its state-owned and private enterprises. During the Third Belt and Road Forum held in October 2023, President Xi Jinping emphasized focusing on signature projects and ‘small but beautiful’ livelihood initiatives while strengthening debt risk management to counter criticisms of ‘debt-trap diplomacy.’ Additionally, efforts to advance the ‘Digital Silk Road’ and ‘Green Silk Road’ were reaffirmed.
Among the cases analyzed, the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway and the China-Laos Railway have been completed and are operational, demonstrating initial successes in freight and passenger transport. The China-Laos Railway is expected to connect with the China-Thailand Railway to form the ‘China-Laos-Thailand Railway,’ which may eventually integrate with Malaysia’s East Coast Rail Link, significantly enhancing transportation networks and trade between China and Southeast Asia. However, challenges persist. Smaller borrowing nations, such as Laos, face significant debt sustainability issues, as seen with Laos’ heavy debt burden from the China-Laos Railway. In contrast, Malaysia has largely moved beyond debt-related controversies, and the China-Thailand Railway avoids such issues due to Thailand’s self-financing approach.
Concerns also arise over China’s growing influence, as seen in Laos’ apprehensions and dissatisfaction with the limited benefits to local enterprises and communities. Myanmar faces rising anti-China sentiment, compounded by skepticism from several ASEAN nations about the economic and investment returns of BRI projects, inadequate supporting measures, and issues such as land acquisition and environmental impact. The China-Myanmar Railway remains stalled due to domestic instability, including coups, civil wars, and resistance from ethnic minorities, rather than direct issues with Chinese investment.
This study highlights the dual challenges and opportunities posed by BRI infrastructure projects, with implications for regional connectivity, economic integration, and Taiwan’s strategic considerations in Southeast Asia.
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